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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern developments in technology and business have made the
world a place where people are more connected and businesses are
1
more competitive than ever. An individual’s ability to interact and do
business with almost any entity around the globe has made the modern
commercial world a flat plane where businesses and people are easily
2
able to compete among each other. As the global economy expands,
trademark becomes more important in the commercialized world
because brands are crossing borders to new markets and people are

1. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., 1st rev.
and expanded ed. 2005) (arguing that developments in technology and business practices
have led to a level playing field for individuals to interact and compete on a global scale).
2. Id. at 8 (“The global competitive playing field was being leveled. The world was
being flattened.”).
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crossing borders to find new brands more than ever.
Despite these evolving commercial interactions, trademark laws
3
remain restrained by the territoriality principle. The territoriality
principle holds that an entity must undertake the appropriate means to
gain trademark protection within a jurisdiction for the jurisdiction to
4
offer its trademark protections. In other words, “[t]he territoriality
principles requires the use to be in the United States” for the mark to
5
garner United States’ trademark protections.
Although countries
outside of the United States abide by the principle of territoriality, most
other countries rely on registration rather than use to secure trademark
6
rights. The famous marks doctrine provides an exception in most
countries. Article 6bis of the Paris Convention and Article 16.2 of the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)
Agreement protect well-known marks not registered or used in a
7
country where protection is sought. Currently, United States federal
courts are split as to whether the famous marks doctrine can protect
8
foreign marks under the Lanham Act. Most courts hold that the Paris
9
Convention is not self-executing and courts uniformly hold the TRIPS

3. The territoriality principle originated with the Supreme Court’s decision in A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). In Bourjois, the plaintiff purchased the rights
to sell and use the trademarks for a certain French face powder in the United States. Id. at
690. The plaintiff re-registered the trademarks in the United States and realized significant
commercial success through importing the French products and selling them using
“substantially the same form of box and label” as the previous owner. Id. at 691. The
defendant sought to profit from a favorable rate of exchange between France and the United
States by purchasing the same powder in France and re-selling the products in America in
“boxes which closely resemble those used by the plaintiff . . . .” Id. The Court rejected the
argument that the defendant’s use of the trademark was protected because it “truly
indicate[d] the origin of the goods.” Id. at 692. Rather, the Court found the trademark was
solely the plaintiff’s to use in the United States and was protected by United States trademark
laws. Id. The public attributed the plaintiff as the source of the goods at issue through the
trademark and therefore the court reversed the lower court’s decision. Id.
4. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2007). The territoriality
principle contrasts from the universality principle, which holds that “a trademark serves the
sole purpose of identifying the source of a product” and it “is valid if it correctly identifies the
origin or source of the product, regardless of where the consumer purchases the product.”
Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Jerome Gilson, 1 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 4.05[5] (2004)).
5. ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d at 155.
6. 3-10 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 10.02 (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green eds.,
Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974).
7. Id. at n.2.
8. 1-3 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.02(b) (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974).
9. Id. § 3.02(b)(ii)(B).
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10

Agreement is not self-executing. In particular, it appears that federal
courts are reluctant to recognize Article 16.2 of TRIPS as applying to
11
the United States.
Numerous authors have addressed whether a flat world is best suited
to stringently adhere to the territoriality principle. In the United States,
some authors argue for Congress to adopt legislation dropping the
12
territoriality principle or at least recognizing exceptions to it. Other
authors argue for courts to take action and adopt exceptions to the
13
territoriality principle on public policy grounds. With these arguments
in mind, intellectual property is confronting difficult problems in
determining who possesses a trademark that is concurrently used by
separate entities.
While the battle over territoriality looms, a rising discussion in
intellectual property law is taking place that addresses whether
14
intellectual property should be legally analyzed as real property. For
example, Henry Smith argues that “intellectual property’s close
relationship to property stems from the role that information costs play
15
in the delineation and enforcement of rights.” Additionally, Richard
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2007), Grupo
Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Article 6bis itself
does not create additional substantive rights.”).
12. See James Faris, Note, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle
in American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451 (2009) (advocating for Congress
to create a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle through legislation) and
Kristin Zobel, Comment, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign
Marks Receive Trademark Protection Within the United States?, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008) (arguing that adoption or rejection of the famous marks doctrine
should come from Congress and not the Supreme Court).
13. Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Call for
American Courts to Grant Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE FOREST
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85 (2009) (arguing federal courts should adopt the famous marks doctrine
on public policy grounds).
14. The Supreme Court most recently recognized “The Lanham Act may well contain
provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests—notably, its provisions
dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because he
can exclude others from using them.” College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaidpostsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999). This Comment, however, follows years of widely
different interpretations of trademarks as property. 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, §
1.03[7][a] (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009)(1974).
See also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1846–47 (2007) (“[C]ritics almost universally characterize modern
doctrines as indicative of a shift in trademark law away from confusion-based protection and
towards a property-based regime that is focused only superficially on consumers.”).
15. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745 (2007) (“[I]ntellectual property’s close relationship to
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Epstein applies rules of acquisition, exclusion, and duration of property
16
Sheldon Halpern acknowledges the
to intellectual property.
movement toward treating trademarks as property but argues that the
17
implications strongly stand in disfavor of this conclusion.
Two
controversial trademark cases add to this discussion and demonstrate
that at least famous trademarks should be examined as property. The
next question, however, is how does one possess a trademark when it is
treated as property?
This Comment engages in that jurisprudential analysis through the
lens of two of the most famous property acquisition theories. Part II
explains the tensions in trademark law when it is based on a tort theory
of recovery through the Malaysian case McCurry Restaurant v.
18
McDonald’s Corp.
This Comment will then demonstrate how this
tension is resolved by relying on treating a trademark as property in
19
Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co. Part III concludes that in a
global economy, the Lockean theory of possessing property best applies
to trademarks treated as property. In a utopian society, made possible
by virtual worlds like Second Life, individuals should rely on a
Blackstone approach.
II. MCCURRY RESTAURANT V. MCDONALD’S CORP. AND GRUPO
GIGANTE SA DE CV V. DALLO & CO.: TOWARD TREATING
TRADEMARK AS REAL PROPERTY
20

As
Trademark protections originated in the context of torts.
trademark law developed, mark owners began to claim an interest in the
21
mark itself and trademark protections moved beyond the concern of
property stems from the role that information costs play in the delineation and enforcement
of rights.”).
16. Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76
IND. L.J. 803 (2001) (applying property rules to the different forms of intellectual property).
17. Sheldon W. Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for the Uneasy
Relationship Between “Property” Rights and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 5–6, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120370 (arguing that if trademark is treated as property, then
“trademark owners, the branding enterprises, will inevitably seek to expand the strength,
power and scope of trademarks”).
18. Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006.
19. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
20. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:7 (4th ed. 2009) (“Since trademark infringement is a type of unfair
competition and unfair competition is a tort, it follows that trademark infringement is a
commercial tort.”).
21. Id. § 2:1 (“Some scholars have criticized modern expansions in trademark law as
treating trademarks as property, inconsistent with the historical focus on trademark law on
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22

consumer confusion. The disadvantages for mark owners in treating
trademarks as a tort theory are prevalent in the Malaysian case of
23
McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp.
The problem for mark
owners is resolved, however, when the property concept of dilution is
introduced to the trademark context. This solution is demonstrated by
24
the American case of Grupo Gigante v. Dallo.
While treating
trademarks as property may relieve these tensions, the question
becomes how one can possess a property interest in trademark.
A. McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp. and the Problems with
Trademark as Tort
One of the consequences of a world that is able to communicate and
travel between distant lands is that successful businesses are entering
25
new geographic territories.
Take, for example, McDonald’s
26
McDonald’s first opened its doors in 1940 in San
restaurants.
27
Bernardino, California. Since that time, McDonald’s has grown to a
28
Today
level of unprecedented fame throughout the world.
McDonald’s has more than 30,000 locations spread across 118
29
countries. Once an exclusively American company, McDonald’s now

the protection of consumers from confusion and deception.”).
22. Halpern, supra note 17, at 3 (“[M]odern trademark disputes, particularly those that
have arisen since the advent of the Internet, are not limited to the traditional ‘unfair
competition’ context.”).
23. Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006.
24. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
25. See Friedman, supra note 1 at 9–10. Friedman describes a period of time referred
to as “Globalization 2.0” (of 3.0) as the development of countries competing on a global
scale. In contrast, Globalization 1.0 is represented by countries driving global integration and
Globalization 3.0 is defined by individuals competing on a global scale.
26. While McDonald’s offers an example of a business physically establishing itself in a
new territory, a second type of example is commercial transactions that occur through the
internet. Internet product sales constitute a significant part of the global economy. For
instance, Amazon.com, a leading internet-based retail giant, posted international sales of
$2.59 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008. Amazon.com profit surges, CHI. TRIB., Jan., 31,
2008, at C2.
27. McDonald’s.com,
Travel
Through
Time
With
Us!,
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/our_company/mcd_history.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
28. The judge in McCurry Restaurant v. McDonald’s Corp. (described below) even
characterized McDonald’s by including, “Everyone knows or has heard of ‘McDonald’s.’”
McCurry Rest. v. McDonald’s Corp., Rayuan Sivil No. W-02-1037-2006, at 1.
29. Randy James, A Brief History of McDonald’s Abroad, TIME, Oct. 28, 2009,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1932839,00.html?iid=sphere-inlinesidebar.

DILL 5.17.10

5/26/2010 1:32 PM

376 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2
30

does over $23.5 billion in international business.
In 2002 a little Malaysian restaurant called McCurry challenged that
31
fame. McCurry was also a restaurant, but it sold Indian and Malaysian
32
cuisine. McDonald’s sued McCurry in Malaysian court challenging its
33
use of the “Mc” trademark in the McCurry name. Throughout the suit,
the owners of McCurry claimed that their use of “Mc” stood for
34
The trial court initially ruled in
“Malaysian Chicken Curry.”
35
McDonald’s favor and ordered the “Mc” removed from McCurry.
On appeal, the court explained that the issue presented was whether
McCurry created a false impression to its customers that its goods,
36
mark, or business was that of McDonald’s. The court determined that
McCurry did not misrepresent its restaurant as associated with
37
McDonald’s. First, there was no semblance between the McCurry and
38
McDonald’s trademarks. Whereas McDonald’s logo consisted of the
famous golden arches, McCurry used “Restoran McCurry” and included
39
“a picture of a chicken giving a double thumbs up . . . .” Second, the
40
use of “Mc” did not go beyond the sign in front of McCurry. While
McDonald’s extensively used the “Mc” prefix on all of its menu items,
41
McCurry did not use the “Mc” mark so extensively. Third, the food
42
Unlike
offered at each establishment was significantly different.
43
McDonald’s fast food, McCurry offered “typically Indian food.”
Finally, the clientele of McDonald’s and McCurry was also significantly
44
different. The court found McDonald’s primarily catered to children
30. Blake Ellis, McDonald’s Wins With Global Palates, CNN.COM, July 13, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/10/news/companies/mcdonalds_global_international_menu.fort
une/index.htm.
31. Baradan Kuppusamy & Kuala Lumpur, McCurry: The Indian Eatery that Beat
Sept.
2,
2009,
available
at
McDonald’s,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article10,8599,1921124,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar.
32. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 1.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Kuppusamy & Lumpur, supra note 31.
35. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 2. See also Kuppusamy & Lumpur, supra note
31.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 10–11.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11.
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45

while McCurry’s clients were mainly adults.
Therefore, despite
46
operating in Malaysia since 1982 with a total of 137 restaurants,
McDonald’s was helpless to stop McCurry from using “Mc.”
The McCurry case demonstrates that relying on a tort-based theory
to enforce trademarks does not provide sufficient remedies for global
companies in the modern economy. The Malaysian court’s analysis
focused on a passing off claim that was defined by how the consuming
47
public interpreted the mark. This tort claim did not recognize the
interest McDonald’s has in the mark itself. McDonald’s must prevent
others from capitalizing on using the mark so it does not become
48
generic. McDonald’s loses the right to claim trademark protections in
its mark once a McDonald’s mark becomes generic through common
49
use.
The interest McDonald’s holds in excluding other entities from using
its marks to maintain their protected status demonstrates why
trademark law must recognize trademarks as a form of real property.
The right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
50
rights that are commonly characterized as property . . . .”
Without
acknowledging that McDonald’s has a right to exclude others from using
its marks to prevent the mark from becoming generic, McDonald’s must
rely on consumer confusion to defend its mark. In McCurry, the court
overturned a lower judge’s ruling that “[w]hen ‘Mc’ is used in
conjunction with a food item, the first impression or the first thing that

45. Id.
46. Julia Zappei, McDonald’s Loses Trademark Fight Against Malaysia’s McCurry,
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/08/mcdonaldsloses-trademark_n_279089.html.
47. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 7 (quoting Mun Loong Co Sdn Bhd v. Chai
Tuck Kin [1982] CLJ 80).
48. Once a mark becomes so common that it is no longer identified to a particular
source, it becomes generic and no longer receives the protections of trademark law.
MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at § 12:1. Courts have declared several marks generic and no
longer subject to trademark protection, including “pilates” (Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts,
120 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)), “yo-yo” (Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg.
Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965)), and “trampoline” (Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am.
Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961). See also Regina Nelson Eng, A
Likelihood of Infringement the Purchase and Sale of Trademarks as Adwords, 18 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 493, 532–33 (2008) (describing aspirin, escalator, and trampoline as once
protected marks that became generic “through popular use”).
49. MCCARTHY, supra note 20.
50. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding Government had to
compensate marina owner pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to force
public access to the marina).
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comes to mind is McDonald’s and the plaintiff.” Instead, the court
ruled that “Mc” associated with the type of Indian food served by the
McCurry restaurant would not create the necessary confusion to order
52
McCurry to discontinue use of the mark. Forcing trademark owners to
rely on the interpretations of the consuming public, however, leaves a
mark owner like McDonald’s without the sufficient ability to prevent its
mark from becoming generic within the international context. A
trademark defense that is based on tort allows non-owners significant
leeway to use a mark before it becomes unlawful infringement but also
may gradually lead to making a mark generic so the mark is no longer
53
protectable.
B. Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co.
A second consequence of living in a flat world is that customers who
associate a mark with a business often cross into a new territory that has
54
not yet received the mark through use or registration.
The Ninth
Circuit confronted this problem in Grupo Gigante Sa de CV v. Dallo &
55
Unlike the McCurry court, the Ninth Circuit in Grupo
Co., Inc.
Gigante was able to craft a remedy for that gave the famous mark owner
56
the ability to protect its mark through a property theory of recovery.
This solution offers strong support for treating trademarks as property
so mark owners may fully protect their interests in a mark.
The plaintiff, Grupo Gigante, was a popular grocery store chain in
57
Mexico that began in the early 1960s.
Grupo Gigante registered
GIGANTE as a trade name in Mexico and by 1991 had almost 100
51. McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 12.
52. Id. at 13.
53. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 12:1 n.12 (citing BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational
Corp., 60 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding AT&T’s failure to defend the “Walking Fingers”
logo led the public to associate the mark generally with classified telephone directories)).
54. The World Tourism Organization estimates there were 922 million international
tourist arrivals throughout the world in 2008. International Tourist Arrivals by (Sub)region,
WORLD
TOURISM
BAROMETER,
Oct.
2009,
at
5,
UNWTO
http://unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom09_3_en_excerpt.pdf.
55. Grupo Gigante Sa de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). See
also Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Restaurant & Café, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (1936) (defendants
attempted to establish restaurants under the guise of plaintiff’s French restaurant that had yet
to establish a presence in New York); Louis Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332
(1959) (same); All Eng. Law Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, Inc. 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1069 (1983) (plaintiff British corporation opposed defendant’s attempt to register the
mark “Wimbledon Cologne” in the United States).
56. Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1097–98.
57. Id. at 1091.
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stores in operation in Mexico with several near the California border.
In August 1991, the defendant, Dallo, began operating a grocery store in
59
San Diego under the name “Gigante Market.” Although at the time
Dallo’s “Gigante Market” opened Grupo Gigante had yet to establish a
presence in the United States, Grupo Gigante attempted to do so in
60
1998. Grupo Gigante was not able to convince Dallo to give up the
Gigante name in a June 1998 meeting, but Grupo Gigante registered the
61
Gigante name with the state of California in the same month.
The Ninth Circuit protected Grupo Gigante’s use of the “Gigante”
mark by recognizing a famous marks exception to the territoriality
62
principle of trademark law. The Ninth Circuit went directly to the
heart of the original intent of trademark law by declaring that “[a]n
absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would
63
promote consumer confusion and fraud.”
In the Grupo Gigante
circumstances, the court was specifically concerned with “[c]ommerce
[that] crosses borders” through Mexican immigrants crossing America’s
64
borders.
The Ninth Circuit relied on a secondary meaning plus analysis to
avoid allowing the famous marks doctrine to entirely swallow the
65
territoriality principle. The court wanted to adhere to the territoriality
principle because of “the lack of a uniform trademark regime across
international borders” and the language within the Paris Convention

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Dallo followed Grupo Gigante’s actions by also registering the Gigante name
with California a month later in July of 1998. Id. at 1092. Neither party, however, registered
the Gigante name federally with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id.
62. Id. at 1094.
63. Id. Although the court acknowledged no other federal circuit authority adopted a
famous marks exception, it cited to the New York decision in Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.
for support of the doctrine. Id. at 1094–95.
64. Id. at 1094.
65. Id. at 1097–98. The Grupo Gigante court considered the level of fame required to
receive trademark protection through a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle
to be significant. The court noted the lack of a clear and uniform standard to apply to
determine whether a mark was famous enough to qualify for the exception. Id. at 1095.
Specifically, Vaudable from the New York courts and the Patent and Trademark Office’s
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board both lacked a clear standard describing the level of fame
necessary to qualify for the exception. The court noted that the famous marks exception is
unlikely to apply to duplicating a purely local, small business mark. Id. at 1094–95. The court
did not agree with the district court, however, which only used secondary meaning to define
how famous a mark had to be before it was granted priority. Id. at 1095–99.
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that supported maintaining the principle.
To this end, the court’s
secondary meaning plus analysis required not only proof of a connection
in consumer’s minds between the product or service and its source, but
additionally required proof “by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market
67
were familiar with the foreign mark.” The court considered several
factors to determine whether a mark was sufficiently famous, including
“intentional copying of the mark” and “whether customers of the
American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the same firm
that uses the mark in another country,” though neither was held to be
68
determinative.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grupo Gigante endorses treating
trademarks as property. The famous marks exception allows the mark
owner to bring a dilution claim of infringement against junior users.
Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, an American trademark owner
69
can bring a claim of dilution by blurring.
Dilution by blurring
recognizes that an infringing mark that is similar to a famous mark
70
“impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” Unlike traditional
trademark infringement, which requires the mark owner to demonstrate
a likelihood of confusion, dilution by blurring does not require proof of
71
a likelihood of confusion or show actual economic injury.
A dilution by blurring claim interprets trademarks as property
because it gives the owner of a famous mark the ability to exclude
72
others from using that mark. Unlike the previous understanding of
trademark theory that relied on consumer confusion, dilution claims
73
give trademark owners a direct interest in the mark. Dilution claims
allow mark owners to protect the inherent value that lies in a trademark
74
by preventing others from reducing that value. Through recognizing
66. Id. at 1098.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
71. 3-11 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 11.07[3] (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (1974).
72. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999) (arguing that dilution laws represent one form of “doctrinal
creep” in which trademark has taken on aspects of property theory).
73. See id.
74. Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of
Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5–9 (2006) (examining the differences between
traditional understandings of trademark law and dilution claims under trademark law). See
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dilution claims, trademark law in the United States appropriately
evolved to meet the needs of famous trademark owners because of the
75
enormous amount of money that can be at stake. Giving trademark
owners the ability to exclude others from using a famous mark not only
recognizes the monetary value of the mark but also supports treating a
mark as real property.
With an understanding that trademark developed to be considered
analogous to property, an important question remains left unanswered
as to how one theoretically possesses a trademark. John Locke and
William Blackstone are two important property theorists that offer
contrasting yet plausible views how acquisition of a trademark as
property can function.
III. LOCKE FOR REALITY AND BLACKSTONE FOR UTOPIA
In her 1985 essay, Carol Rose explains how an individual possesses
76
property. Rose assumes that first possession is the “root” of property
77
ownership in the common law. In her analysis, Rose principally relies
on two theories to explain how one possesses property: “(1) notice to
78
the world through a clear act, and (2) reward to useful labor.” The
fathers of these theories are very familiar to property scholars and
should surprise no one; the clear act principle is attributed to William
79
Blackstone, while John Locke articulated the labor theory of property
80
possession. Through analyzing Blackstone’s and Locke’s theories, one
can understand the underlying assumptions of how real property is
assigned to owners so those assumptions can be applied to trademarks.
This analysis demonstrates that the Lockean labor theory best applies to
trademarks as real property because of the knowledge the consuming
public carries with them to any given market. In a utopian world where
individuals confront all marks for the first time, however, the
Blackstone clear-act principle prevails.

also Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 312 (2003) (“[A]
standard of dilution based solely on a mark conjuring another reflects a view that a famous
mark has a singular association in people’s minds and is entitled to protection against any
background noise that might interfere with the purity of that association.”).
75. See Manning, supra note 74, at 8. Manning discusses the example of PepsiCo that
paid $13.4 billion for Quaker Oats principally for the Gatorade brand name.
76. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L REV. 73 (1985).
77. Id. at 75.
78. Id. at 77.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 73–74.
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A. Locke—Labor Theory
Locke’s premise of how one comes to possess property is considered
81
one of the founding theories in property law. He begins from the
82
premise that God bestowed land unto mankind. Locke then relies on
83
an individual’s labor to define how one possesses property.
Locke’s labor theory assumes that an individual possesses his or her
84
body. Because an individual has an exclusive interest in his body, the
individual holds a similar interest in the work or labor that body
85
completes. Locke explains, “Whatsoever then [man] removes out of
the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
86
makes it his Property.” When an individual’s labor mixes with an
object that exists in nature, the individual removes the property from its
87
natural state to make it his or her own. Removing objects from their
88
natural state in this way “begins the Property.” Once an individual has

81. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 371 (2003) (examining how Locke’s labor theory uses the right to exclude to define
property as distinguished from the modern bundle and exclusion theories of property). While
most consider Locke to be one of the foundational theorists when describing property rights,
some argue that his Second Treatise of Government does not describe property rights at all.
Rather, Locke merely describes “possession or appropriation with no real title.” Paul
Thomas, Property’s Properties: From Hegel to Locke, 84 REPRESENTATIONS 30, 38 (2003).
Although the distinction is noteworthy and may be important to arguments on rights after
acquisition, it is not relevant to this discussion.
82. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 286 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For Locke, God plays a major role in creating and
giving purpose to property. Locke later comments, “[I]t cannot be supposed [God] meant
[property] should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the
Industrious and Rational, . . . not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and
Contentious.” Id. at 291. Locke was not the only property theorist to start from this premise
of how property first developed as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf also took a similar
position. Mossoff, supra note 81, at 376.
83. Locke, supra note 82, at 288.
84. Id. at 287. See also Thomas, supra note 81, at 38 for a discussion on criticisms of
Locke’s assumption of self-possession.
85. Locke, supra note 82, at 287–88.
86. Id. at 288. Labor represents the answer to Locke’s quintessential problem of how
to derive individual property rights from property that was held in common. Mossoff, supra
note 81, at 386 (“Locke is confronted with the quandary of how to derive property from
common use-rights without the device of consent.”). Mossoff notes that in another of
Locke’s works he wrote that “God’s original grant ‘was not to Adam in particular, exclusive
of all other Men: whatever Dominion he had thereby, it was not a Private Dominion, but a
Dominion in common with the rest of Mankind.’” Id.
87. Locke, supra note 82, at 288.
88. Id. at 288–89.
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acquired property, he or she is free to take advantage of its benefits.
Locke places important limits on one’s ability to possess property
through the concept of waste. Just as an individual is free to possess
that which he or she can acquire through labor, an individual is
90
susceptible to lose that which he or she wastes. Locke demonstrates
this point by noting “if either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the
ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and
laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still
91
to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any other.”
Therefore, where one does not take advantage of that which he or she
has labored over, then his or her possessory interest in that property is
92
lost.
Locke’s approach is consistent with the principles of trademark
because a potential mark owner must work to create an association
between itself and the mark to gain protection in the mark. A
trademark owner works to establish an association between the mark
and the owner so consumers know what kind of product they are
purchasing and from whom they are purchasing it. The labor a mark
owner puts into creating that association is tied to the labor that Locke
discusses above. The reputation built through labor best represents the
93
original purpose of trademark law: to prevent consumer confusion.
The reputation necessary to gain trademark protection, however, is not
built in a day because consumers need time to build the association in
94
their minds. Therefore, Locke better relies on the passive association
89. Id. at 290. See also Mossoff, supra note 81, at 389 (“By mixing something one
already owns—labor—with an object in the commons, the resulting product is, morally
speaking, removed from the commons and itself becomes exclusively owned, i.e., it becomes
property.”).
90. Id. at 295.
91. Id.
92. Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence
of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential
Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 712–13 (2003) (discussing Locke’s view on the failure to
take advantage of property as waste and violation of the Law of Nature). See also Carol M.
Rose, “Enough, and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 417, n.72 (“Locke’s mode of
preserving plenitude was the prohibition against waste . . . .”).
93. See Halpern, supra note 17.
94. In this regard, trademark may be analogous to forming a habit. Many famously
believe that it takes 28 days to develop a new habit. However, studies show it can take three
times that amount of time to form a new habit. Oliver Burkeman, This column will change
your life: How long does it really take to change a habit, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2009,
www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2009/oct/10/change-your-life-habit-28-day-rule. Considering
one is unlikely to confront a trademark as routinely as a person committed to learning a new
habit, it seems safe to assume that the period of time necessary to learn brand name
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that builds between a mark and its owner in consumers’ minds through
use of the mark rather than an active declaration by a mark owner.
Further, Locke’s concept of waste is well-suited to apply to
trademark because it coincides with trademark’s purpose to prevent
consumer confusion and to protect the goodwill of a mark owner.
Where the mark owner does not maintain efforts to help keep the
association between a mark and its source strong in the minds of
consumers, the purpose of protecting that mark is lost and it becomes
95
generic. In such a case, a mark owner appropriately loses its interest in
a mark because consumers are no longer duped into purchasing one
good or service while erroneously believing it is from a different source
96
because the mark no longer correlates to a singular source.
The facts in the Malaysian McCurry case demonstrate why the
97
Lockean labor theory is best suited to apply to trademark law. Locke’s
labor theory relies on the mark owner sufficiently working with the
mark to gain an ownership interest in it. McDonald’s significantly
mixed its labor by building its presence in the Malaysian market by
opening 137 restaurants throughout the country. Over the course of
more than two decades, McDonald’s established in customers minds
that the “Mc” at a fast food hamburger restaurant indicated
McDonald’s goods and services would be sold.
The Malaysian court’s opinion fits well with the Lockean theory of
possessing property because it identifies the limits to McDonald’s labor
with the “Mc” mark when trademark is not viewed as property. Rather
than grant McDonald’s carte blanche over using “Mc,” the court
identified several distinctions with McCurry’s use of the mark that
prevented consumer confusion. McDonald’s did not work to associate
in consumer’s minds the “Mc” mark with a chicken giving the thumbs
up or Indian food. Rather, McCurry was working to establish this
relationship and had the right to use the “Mc” mark in this manner.
While the court recognized that McDonald’s labored to establish a

recognition is longer.
95. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20.
96. See id.
97. Like the United States, Malaysia has a trademark registry but it is not necessary to
register a mark to gain some trademark protections.
IntellectFront.com, Malaysia
Trademark—Registration
and
Search
Information,
http://www.intellectfront.com/info/malaysia-trademark.html#information (last visited Apr. 6,
2010). There is nothing in the Malaysian court’s decision to indicate whether McDonald’s
previously registered the “Mc” mark with Malaysian authorities.
Additionally, as
McDonald’s based its claim on a “passing off” suit, it is likely that it did not register its mark.
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sufficient link between “Mc” and fast food, this link was not the focus
of McCurry’s labor. Therefore, under Locke’s theory of property
acquisition, the Malaysian court appropriately recognized that
McDonald’s did not have sufficient trademark protections to exclude
McCurry’s use of the “Mc” mark.
Locke’s labor theory of acquiring property better explains
acquisition of the trademark in the Grupo Gigante case as well. Grupo
Gigante worked for decades to establish the Gigante mark as the name
for Grupo Gigante goods and services by creating hundreds of stores
throughout Mexico. Because Grupo Gigante expanded throughout
Mexico, many Mexicans recognized the Gigante name and associated
that name with Grupo Gigante’s products. When individuals who knew
the Gigante mark in Mexico left for the United States, they carried with
them Grupo Gigante’s established reputation with the Gigante mark.
Without Grupo Gigante’s labor to create and maintain the reputation it
enjoyed, it would have no interest in claiming a possessory interest in
the Gigante mark.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit appropriately
recognized a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle when
Locke’s labor theory is considered the means of establishing a property
interest in a trademark.
B. Blackstone’s Clear-Act Principle
As one of the principal sources for understanding common law
doctrines, William Blackstone has gained certain notoriety among legal
99
scholars.
Blackstone’s principal legacy comes from the ideas he
100
Blackstone
espoused in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.
famously explained property as “that sole and despotic dominion which
one claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
101
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
98. See McCurry Rest., W-02-1037-2006 at 10–11.
99. See Mossoff, supra note 81, at 397–403 (using Blackstone to explain the integrate
theory of property), Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly
Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9 (1987) (examining the influence of
Blackstone and other theorists on the founding fathers’ vision for America) and Shelby D.
Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245, 250–51
(2003) (using Blackstone to explain the foundations of property in the common law).
100. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ’g Ltd. 2001) (1765-1769).
101. Id. at 3. Mossoff notes that where Blackstone relies on exclusion to define
property in Volume II of Comentaries, this approach differs significantly from his Volume I
of the Commentaries where he relied on “free use, enjoyment, and disposal” to define
property. Mossoff, supra note 81, at 398.
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Blackstone, like Locke, began by presuming that in the beginning all
102
Initially, any
the world was held by everyone as common property.
103
person’s dominion over property was determined by its use. As man’s
numbers in population grew, however, a more permanent dominion was
104
Thus, the rule of first possession was born to determine
necessary.
105
who had rights to property. Blackstone then explained that possessing
property required “a declaration that [a person] intends to appropriate
the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of universal
law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an intention to
106
abandon it[.]”
Rose describes Blackstone’s act of declaring a
107
possessory interest in property as the “clear-act principle.” Therefore,
if one can communicate to a relevant audience that he or she is the first
to possess a piece of property, then that individual has a right to own
that property.
Blackstone’s theory may seem difficult to apply to trademark for
two reasons. First, like Locke, Blackstone begins with the premise that
108
land was given from a higher power to all of man. This basis implies
that the property Blackstone addressed had certain boundaries to it.
However, trademark is not so definite because it is based on language.
Language is not forced to adhere to the boundaries that real property is
required to adhere. An individual cannot claim to possess a piece of
real property today that they could not have claimed to possess
yesterday because it did not exist. Additionally, new words are
109
continuously added to any language’s vocabulary. Over time, cultural
110
changes modify or add to the meaning of words. Language represents
102. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 4–5.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5. See also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property
Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, n.93 (2009) (describing how Blackstone viewed the
evolution of property rights).
105. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 4–5.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Rose, supra note 76, at 77.
108. BLACKSTONE, supra note 100, at 3–4.
109. In 2009 Merriam-Webster added almost 100 new words including such entries as
“frenemy,” one who pretends to be a friend but is actually an enemy, and staycation, a
vacation spent at home or nearby. Merriam-Webster.com, Planning a staycation this year?,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/newwords09.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
110. With the advent of social networks such as Facebook, “friend” added to its
definition by becoming a verb (friending) that generally means to be added to one’s social
networking audience. See Julia Angwin, How Facebook is Making Friending Obsolete, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126084637203791583.html.
See also Robert J. Menner, Multiple Meaning and Change of Meaning in English, 21
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a concept with greater flexibility than real property, which may make
Blackstone’s clear-act theory difficult to apply to trademarks.
Second, Blackstone’s clear-act theory of possession is difficult to
apply to trademarks because he does not make clear what gesture is
sufficient to constitute a “clear-act” announcing a possessory interest in
property. Rose alludes to this problem when she observes that the
clear-act principle implies that the declarant’s gesture must be received
111
by “the relevant audience at the appropriate time.” Rose even goes so
far as to cite copyright and patents as areas where this problem is
112
Trademark goes a step further than patents or
especially prevalent.
copyright, however, because it is not based on what the potential mark
owner says or how he or she acts. Rather, trademarks primarily exist to
prevent consumer confusion and they are created by the association
113
consumers form with a mark.
While a copyright can rely on when
114
words are put to paper and patent can similarly rely on when an
115
invention is put to practice or filed with the appropriate office,
trademark cannot rely on such definitive acts. An individual could rely
116
on use in commerce to protect their trademark, but the McCurry case
demonstrates that use alone does not provide clear boundaries for the
protections a mark should receive. Remedies are also available under
the Lanham Act for infringement against those marks that are not
registered but their owners have filed an intent to use the mark in
117
commerce. A mark protected in this way, however, provides no clearact for individuals participating in the market, or the “relevant
audience,” where the mark is yet to present itself through reputation or
use.
By relying on consumer associations, trademarks are left
LANGUAGE 59 (1945) (discussing the change in meaning of several common English words
from 700 A.D. to the present).
111. Rose, supra note 76, at 83.
112. Id. Rose is not the only one who is reluctant to apply theories of possession to
trademark. See D.B. Resnick, A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property, 46 J. BUS.
ETHICS 319, 320–21, (2003). Although Resnick notes that Lockean theory may best be suited
to apply to trademarks in the IP arena, he only provides fuller criticism of the theory through
copyright and patent. Id.
113. 1-1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03(1) (Anne Gilson LaLonde & Karin Green
eds., Matthew Bender & Co. 2009) (1974). See also Halpern, supra note 17.
114. To gain copyright protection, a work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
115. An inventor seeking to patent an invention must file an application with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Donald S. Chisum, 4–11 Chisum on Patents §
11.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2010 (1998).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
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vulnerable to a lack of clear-act that can indicate when a word or phrase
is possessed.
C. Virtual Property—Second Life Offers a Second Chance for
Blackstone
The McCurry v. McDonald’s and Grupo Gigante v. Dallo cases
present situations where the knowledge biases of consumers present too
great of a challenge for the Blackstone clear-act principle to apply.
Instead, one must acknowledge the work required to create the
necessary recognition with a brand to find a mark worthy of trademark
protection. A unique situation presents itself with virtual property
where a population is established and grows in a short amount of time.
One such virtual world is the popular online three-dimensional
118
universe called Second Life. Second Life allows individuals to create
119
avatars that exist in the Second Life world. Once inside, individuals
can buy Second Life land, create Second Life businesses, and run
120
completely Second Life lives. Second Life even has its own currency
121
system, Linden Dollars, which can be exchanged for real life currency.
There are no winners and losers per se in second life, just people living
out another life.
Second Life is a significant commercial market with a free flowing
122
currency and vast population.
Second Life’s terms of service,
however, do not reflect its commercial strength and the terms protect
123
intellectual property vaguely at best.
While Second Life strongly
118. SecondLife.com, Home Page, http://secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
Second Life Home Page, http://secondlife.com. Second Life was created by Linden Lab, a
company residing in San Francisco, California.
LindenLab.com, Home Page,
http://lindenlab.com (Apr. 3, 2010).
119. SecondLife.com, Home Page, http://secondlife.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
120. Id. Second Life was even prominently featured in the popular American TV
show, The Office in the episode entitled Local Ad of Season 4. TV.com, The Office Season 4
Episode Guide, http://www.tv.com/the-office/show/22343/episode.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
121. Currency Exchange, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency.php.
Second Life explains that the exchange rate with U.S. currency has remained fairly stable as
of late, at a 250 Linden Dollars to 1 U.S. Dollar rate.
122. Linden Labs reports that in March 2009 there were 732,526 unique residents with
repeat logs. Additionally, the Second Life economy topped $120 million U.S. dollars in the
first quarter of 2009, with 120 million user-to-user transactions. The Second Life Economy—
First Quarter 2009 in Detail,
https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2009/04/16/the-second-life-economy-first-quarter-2009-in-detail (April 16, 2009, 2:00:54 PM).
123. See Terms of Service, Second Life, § 7 Content Licenses and Intellectual Property
Rights, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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124

protects Linden Lab’s trademarks,
users “retain any and all
Intellectual Property Rights [they] already hold under applicable law . . .
125
.”
This lack of clarity is especially evident considering Second Life
126
Second Life does not
users come from countries all over the world.
regulate trademark infringement itself or provide a means for resolving
infringement in the real world. Several high profile companies, such as
Coca-Cola and Adidas, conduct business by selling products within the
Second Life universe, but these companies are susceptible to individuals
taking advantage of their marks by producing counterfeit goods under
127
the same mark.
While users are attempting to resolve trademark
issues in Second Life by creating a Second Life Patent and Trademark
128
office, this alternative authority is yet to be firmly established.
Unsurprisingly, parties seeking to enforce real world trademark
protections have left Second Life to seek protection in real life courts.
In Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., plaintiff Eros brought a classaction suit alleging Linden Labs provided the tools through Second Life
129
for others to infringe on Eros’s real-life trademarks.
Eros first used
the SexGen mark in January 2005 and registered the SexGen mark with
130
Despite
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in August 2008.
Linden Lab’s knowledge of widespread trademark infringement, Eros
claims Linden Lab took no action to prevent parties from purchasing
“infringing knockoffs of trademarked virtual goods and services,” such

124. See id., § 7.6. Linden Lab owns Intellectual Property Rights in and to the Service,
except all User Content, and in and to the Linden Marks.
125. See id., § 7.1. A person retains any and all Intellectual Property Rights he submits
to the Service.
126. Max Vern, Second Life—A New Dimension for Trademark Infringement, 90 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 51, 53 (2008) (noting that Second Life avatars are
controlled by users from more than 100 countries with U.S. residents constituting 30% of the
population).
127. See Complaint at 4, Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 15, 2009). While Eros points to these examples, trademark infringement may be
more rampant than one might first guess. Prior research revealed 16 shops advertising
FERRARI cars, 40 stores advertising ROLEX and CHANEL watches, 50 stores selling
GUCCI, PRADA, RAYBAN, and OAKLEY sunglasses. Further, a search of NIKE under
the Second Life classifieds reveals 186 hits though Nike does not sell any of these shoes. Ever
the present controversy in real life, several stores are selling iPODs loaded with copyright
infringing songs. Benjamin Duranske, Rampant Trademark Infringement in Second Life
Costs Millions, Undermines Future Enforcement, VIRTUALLYBLIND.COM (May 4, 2007),
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/05/04/trademark-infringement-vws/.
128. Vern, supra note 126 at 56.
129. Complaint, Eros, LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH.
130. Id. at 11.
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as Eros’s SexGen virtual beds. Not only does Eros claim that Linden
Lab allowed this infringing activity to take place, but Eros also claims
that Linden Lab made a profit by charging parties a fee to rent space to
sell and to upload infringing goods, running a currency exchange with
exchange fees, operating an online marketplace where infringing goods
were sold, and operating a classified ads system where infringing goods
132
were advertised for sale. As a result of illicit merchants selling Eros’s
products, Eros’s claims consumer confusion as to the origin of goods
and harm to Eros’s good reputation within the Second Life
133
community.
Creating trademarks in virtual worlds that are based on the real
world presents a unique problem for determining who possesses a
trademark. The inhabitants of a virtual world such as Second Life are
controlled by real life individuals who bring certain source-trademark
knowledge through participating in real world markets. Virtual world
inhabitants uniquely enter their virtual territories and markets with
developed associations between trademarks and their sources. Real
world trademarks, on the other hand, rely on businesses to develop
associations between the product and the company through the types of
cases listed above. Trademark holders either develop the association by
going to the consumer, or by potential consumers going to the market
where the trademark already exists. In either of these real world cases,
there is no association for the consumer in a jurisdiction until that
association is developed. Although some virtual world users are likely
to come from real world territories where trademarks at issue in the
virtual world have not yet entered their real world market, the dominant
concern for trademark holders remains how virtual worlds protect
trademarks.
Whether Blackstone’s or Locke’s theory of property possession best
applies to trademarks in virtual worlds like Second Life is largely
influenced by whether Second Life is viewed as a separate jurisdiction
governed by the principle of territoriality or is an extension of the real
life world in which the virtual world is created. Carrying the principle of
131. Id. at 7. Eros may not have morality on its side as it enters this lawsuit. The
SexGen product line allows Second Life users to engage in virtual sex within Second Life.
These products have proven popular within the Second Life community as Eros’s founder
Kevin Alderman claims $1 million in total revenue from the Eros product line. David
Kravets, Linden Lab Targeted in Second Life Sex-Code Lawsuit, WIRED, Sept. 17, 2009,
available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/linden/.
132. Complaint at 8, Eros LLC v. Linden Research, Inc., 09-CV-04269-PJH.
133. Id. at 11–12.
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territoriality to virtual worlds and treating those worlds as separate
jurisdictions clarifies where trademark protections stop. The trademark
holder in a different jurisdiction then understands it must undertake
new efforts to gain trademark protection in the virtual world.
Eliminating the principle of territoriality from virtual worlds, on the
other hand, increases the uncertainty over who possesses a mark
because avatars are controlled by individuals who already attribute
trademarks to certain sources. Virtual worlds should not be governed
by the principle of territoriality because preventing consumer confusion
is the primary aim of a trademark.
Blackstone’s clear-act principle to acquire property is best applied to
trademarks in a virtual world when the principle of territoriality is
applied to treat the virtual world as a separate jurisdiction. If the
principle of territoriality carries into the virtual world, then the initial
acts of potential trademark holders to develop their products in virtual
spaces takes on more significant meaning to gain possession of those
134
marks. With significantly less people in the virtual world than real life,
each use of a mark strongly declares that the mark for a product
indicates a certain source. The use of a mark strongly declares an entity
possesses a trademark in densely populated areas of the virtual world
because a mark’s use is witnessed by more avatars. Absent the principle
of territoriality, Blackstone’s clear-act theory is left vulnerable to the
135
same problems outlined above.
In the case of Eros, the clear act likely occurred with its first use in
January 2005. This time is when the SexGen mark was first used and
was within a matter of months from when Linden Lab created the
Second Life world. Few products of its kind were likely sold within the
Second Life universe at the time. Those individuals encountering these
products were likely to cross Eros’s trademark and strongly associate
the SexGen product line with the SexGen mark. In such a young world
with few inhabitants, Eros’s use of the SexGen mark acted as a clear act
and declared to inhabitants of Second Life that the SexGen product line
associated with the SexGen mark and Eros.

134. Not only is there fewer than one million unique users on Second Life, but its
growth to that number has occurred in a relatively short period of time. The beta version of
second life was opened in late 2002 with the consumer version available the following year.
Press Release, Linden Lab, Linden Lab Announces Name of New Online World ‘Second
Life’ and Availability of Beta Program, (Oct. 30, 2002) available at
http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/02_10_30.
135. See Section III(B).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Trademark law’s importance has grown as national economies
expand into global economies. As trademark’s role in our world has
grown, so has the discussion of treating a holder’s interest in a mark as
real property. The McCurry and Grupo Gigante cases demonstrate the
tension in treating trademark strictly as a tort and how that tension is
relieved when trademark is treated as property.
By applying
Blackstone’s and Locke’s theories to these situations, it is evident that
Locke’s labor theory best captures the original purpose of trademark
law. Locke’s theory is especially well suited when one further considers
that although our world operates in a global economy, we still
stringently adhere to the principle of territoriality. An exception lies
where a new world is created that abides by the principal of
territoriality. In that narrow case, the Blackstone theory of property
acquisition has a role to play to determine who owns a trademark.
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